Saxony-Anhalt Has Voted. And I Am Drawing My Own Conclusions.
An Election Result That Frightens Me
There are election results that people discuss. You look at gains and losses, calculate possible coalitions, and wait to see which parties will eventually talk to one another. And then there are election results that trigger something much deeper.
For me, this belongs to the second category.
According to the preliminary result, the AfD won the state election in Saxony-Anhalt on September 6, 2026, with 43.8 percent of the vote. It more than doubled its 2021 result and, with 39 of 83 seats, fell three mandates short of an absolute majority. The CDU collapsed from 37.1 to 17.2 percent. It is followed by the SPD with 9.3 percent, the Greens with 8.9 percent, and the Left Party with 8.6 percent. The BSW entered parliament with 5.3 percent. The FDP clearly failed with 2.6 percent and is no longer represented in the state parliament. [1] [2] [3]
The new state parliament therefore consists of 39 seats for the AfD, 15 for the CDU, 8 each for the SPD, Greens, and Left Party, and 5 for the BSW. It shrinks from 97 to 83 members because the AfD won 38 direct mandates this time, almost exactly within the number of seats to which it was entitled based on its second-vote share, meaning that hardly any compensatory seats were needed. [2] [3]
One detail of this election describes the shift better than any percentage: the CDU failed to win a single one of the 41 constituencies directly. In 2021, it had won 40 of 41. The AfD won 38 direct mandates, while the remaining three went to the Left Party in Magdeburg and Halle. In the second vote, the AfD came first in 40 of the 41 constituencies. The only exception was Halle III, where the Greens became the strongest party with 33.7 percent. [4]
Then there is a number that I initially thought had to be a typo. Voter turnout rose from 60.3 percent in 2021 to 77.8 percent. [2] This result did not come about through apathy. It came about through mobilization. People went to the polls, and in numbers not seen in Saxony-Anhalt since the 1990s.
This was not a narrow election victory and not a regionally limited protest vote. Almost 44 percent gave their vote to a party whose state branch has been classified by Saxony-Anhalt’s domestic intelligence service as confirmed far-right extremist since the fall of 2023. The agency justifies this classification by citing attacks on human dignity and the principle of democracy. The AfD is challenging the classification before the Administrative Court in Magdeburg. The proceedings are suspended until a decision is made on the classification of the federal party. Until then, the state authorities in Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, Thuringia, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania are allowed to maintain their own assessments. [5] [6]
I cannot look at this result as though it were merely another difficult process of forming a government. It leaves me stunned. More than anything, it frightens me.
This Fear Is Not Abstract
As a trans woman, I cannot treat the AfD as an ordinary party whose tax or transportation policy I simply happen to dislike. Its politics target the visibility, safety, and social existence of people like me. It does not merely question individual political measures. It attacks the very idea that queer and trans people naturally and equally belong to Germany.
That is not an accusation I am inventing. It is written in the party platform. The 258-page government program of the AfD Saxony-Anhalt is titled “The Country First” and describes itself not as a change of government, but as a political, social, and institutional restructuring of the state. It speaks about people like me in language that requires no interpretation. It refers to “non-normal gender identities” and “deviant sexual preferences.” [7] [8]
Then there are the concrete plans: a comprehensive remigration policy with deportation detention facilities and a dedicated commissioner, a nationally oriented school and university policy including revised history curricula, a restructuring of publicly funded media, political education, and state-funded cultural and social projects, as well as the declared intention to terminate the broadcasting treaties as a first official act. [7] [8] [9]
These are not ambiguous side remarks. They are declared political goals.
When a party like this receives almost half the vote, I cannot tell myself that it probably will not be that bad. History does not become dangerous only when democratic institutions have already fallen. It becomes dangerous at the moment when people know what an authoritarian party intends to do and nevertheless want to give it power.
Politically, hardly anything more dramatic could happen to us in Germany than an AfD that actually gains executive power. At that point, it is no longer just about provocative speeches, dehumanizing motions from the opposition benches, or calculated boundary-breaking on social media. A state government decides over police, schools, culture, media policy, funding, and large parts of the administration. It can open or close social spaces. It can protect people or deliberately make them less protected.
What Institutions Can Do and What They Cannot
Some of the announced measures would run into legal obstacles. Broadcasting is a good example. There has not even been a single “broadcasting state treaty” since 2020. What is meant are three successor treaties. A state can terminate them no earlier than the end of a year, with a two-year notice period, so a termination after this election would not take effect until the end of 2028. Saxony-Anhalt, of all states, is also the only one that requires parliamentary approval to terminate state treaties. A purely abusive termination would also be open to legal challenge. [9]
These forms of friction are real, and I have no interest in minimizing them. But they do not protect what worries me most. Funding decisions, personnel appointments, curriculum development, police leadership, and the question of which organizations in the state continue to receive money and which do not are not subject to two-year notice periods. They depend on ministries.
That is why I find it naive to hope that institutions will somehow contain a far-right government. Institutions are made up of people. Rules have to be applied, defended, and sometimes enforced against those who now control staffing, responsibilities, and budgets themselves.
A Victory Without Immediate Power
The AfD is not governing yet. An absolute majority requires 42 of the 83 seats. The AfD has 39. All other parties combined hold 44 mandates. [3]
At first glance, that sounds reassuring. A closer look reveals the real problem.
A majority government without the AfD would only be possible if the CDU, SPD, Greens, Left Party, and BSW acted together. Not one of those five parties could be left out. [3] Such a coalition would have to bridge political differences stretching from the CDU to the Left Party and from the Greens to the BSW. On top of that, the CDU’s incompatibility resolution still prohibits cooperation with the Left Party. Mathematically, a five-party coalition is possible. Politically, it is difficult to imagine. Its majority would also amount to only two votes.
A coalition between the AfD and CDU would have a comfortable majority with 54 seats. So far, the CDU has clearly ruled this out. I very much hope that this promise still stands once the pressure grows and the first voices begin talking about some supposed responsibility to respect the election result. Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla already spoke on election night of a clear mandate to govern. Before the election, Ulrich Siegmund had said he did not want to become minister-president without an absolute majority of his own. During election night, however, he explicitly stopped ruling out coalition-building and announced that he would extend a hand to all political forces willing to support a fundamental change of course. [10] [11]
That is precisely where another danger lies. A far-right party does not necessarily have to provide the minister-president in order to gain political influence. It may be enough for other parties to adopt its motions, organize joint majorities, or shift their own boundaries piece by piece.
The BSW positioned itself early and is sticking to its line. Amira Mohamed Ali stated that her party would vote for neither Siegmund nor incumbent minister-president Sven Schulze. Instead, the BSW is advocating a third option with a broadly respected nonpartisan figure at the top and changing parliamentary majorities. In a third round of voting, the parliamentary group would abstain. [10] [11] [12]
At the moment, the most likely solution appears to be a minority government, perhaps consisting of the CDU, SPD, and Greens, which would depend on outside support for the election of the minister-president and for central projects. Such arrangements might prevent an AfD government. That would not make them stable.
The Secret Ballot and Its Danger
The new state parliament must convene no later than the thirtieth day after the election, meaning by early October. Since the parliamentary reform of 2020, the state constitution no longer sets a deadline by which the minister-president must be elected. Until then, the current government can remain in office in a caretaker capacity. [13]
Once parliament begins the procedure, however, the mechanism of Article 65 of the state constitution applies. In the first round, the person who receives the majority of all members is elected, meaning 42 votes. If no one reaches that threshold, a second round follows within seven days with the same requirement. If that also fails, the state parliament must decide within fourteen days whether to end the legislative term early. That decision also requires 42 votes. If parliament rejects dissolution, another round of voting takes place immediately. At that point, a majority of votes cast is sufficient. Abstentions do not count. [13] [14]
The minister-president is elected without debate and by secret ballot. [14] Party decisions and public assurances alone are therefore not enough to rule out every surprise.
And this is where it becomes uncomfortably concrete. If the BSW abstains in the third round as announced, the AfD’s 39 votes would be matched by 39 votes from the CDU, SPD, Greens, and Left Party. According to the preliminary result, that is a tie. I recalculated it several times because I initially could not believe it. During election night, a calculation of 40 to 39 in Schulze’s favor was still circulating, but it was based on an estimate in which the BSW held only four seats. [11]
At that point, the result no longer depends on coalition negotiations, but on individual people casting secret ballots. One absent member of parliament, one additional abstention, one ballot marked differently than agreed: with these numbers, any of those would be enough. It would not require a mass political movement within the CDU or BSW. A handful of people would suffice. On top of that, there is a legal question that has not yet been settled: how exactly must the ballot paper be designed in the third round so that the majority of votes cast can be determined cleanly? [14]
I do not want to rely on reassuring statements in this situation. Political promises have an astonishingly short half-life once a concrete opportunity to take power presents itself. Siegmund’s change of course within just a few hours on election night has already demonstrated that.
New Elections Could Make Everything Even Worse
Early elections are possible, but they are not currently the most likely scenario. The AfD cannot trigger them with its 39 seats alone, because dissolution also requires 42 votes. [13] [14]
That reduces the immediate pressure. It does not remove the risk.
For most parties, new elections would be dangerous. After its historic collapse, the CDU cannot know whether it would recover quickly. With its 5.3 percent, the BSW could fall below the electoral threshold. The Left Party, SPD, and Greens would also have to expect the entire campaign to revolve around one question: whether the AfD should be allowed to govern alone.
The AfD, on the other hand, would have a simple and effective narrative: despite its clear election victory, it had been denied government. It could portray every agreement among the other parties as a disregard for the will of the voters. The fact that a parliamentary majority can of course be formed against the strongest party would play little role in that performance.
There is currently no reliable post-election poll for a possible repeat election. The final surveys before the election put the AfD at around 42 percent and the CDU at around 22 percent. [15] In reality, the AfD finished at 43.8 percent and the CDU at only 17.2 percent. Both polling institutes underestimated the AfD and substantially overestimated the CDU. The current election result is therefore the most reliable available basis for any cautious assessment.
In a quick repeat election, the AfD would again be the clear favorite. An absolute majority would not be certain, but it would be frighteningly realistic. If the BSW remained above five percent, the AfD would need roughly 46 to 47 percent. If the BSW failed to clear the threshold, however, the situation would change dramatically. A simplified calculation of my own based on the preliminary result would already give the AfD 41 seats if all other vote shares remained unchanged. The AfD’s share of votes relevant to seat allocation would then be just under 49.9 percent. A very small additional increase in votes would be enough for an absolute majority.
It is equally possible that a new election would produce almost exactly the same result. Saxony-Anhalt would then have spent a great deal of time, energy, and trust without solving the problem at all.
I Am Drawing My Own Personal Conclusion
I do not want to hide my fear behind detached language. This election result changes the way I see Saxony-Anhalt.
For me, one thing is certain: over the coming years, I will not knowingly spend a single cent in this state. I will not vacation there, book a hotel, visit a restaurant, or attend an event. I will not attend seminars or training courses there. I will also avoid professional or private stays.
If a route takes me through Saxony-Anhalt, I will pass through the state. But I will not refuel there, shop there, or stop along the way.
I am aware that 43.8 percent is not everyone in Saxony-Anhalt. Queer people live there. Trans people live there. Committed democrats, activists, and all those who made a different choice yesterday live there too. In Halle and Magdeburg, there are enough of them to win constituencies. Many of them will suffer the consequences of this result far more directly than I will. My decision is not directed against those people.
Even so, I cannot and do not want to make my personal response depend on whether the money I spend eventually goes to someone who voted for the AfD. There is no way to know or control that. I am simply deciding where I spend my time, where I feel safe, and where my money goes. For the foreseeable future, Saxony-Anhalt is no longer one of those places for me.
This is not a call to action and not an expectation that others should do the same. It is my boundary.
Democracy Does Not Mean Accepting Every Result Without Emotion
Of course the election was democratic. That is precisely why the result is so disturbing. Democracy does not guarantee good decisions. It gives people the opportunity to take responsibility. That includes responsibility for what they enable with their vote.
The fact that a party was democratically elected says nothing about whether its goals are democratic, humane, or harmless. A free election does not require me to normalize the result internally. I do not have to pretend that this is merely another political shift to be analyzed with professional detachment.
I am allowed to be afraid. I am allowed to be angry. I am allowed to draw consequences.
At the same time, the democratic parties must not pretend that this result can be answered with a few new slogans or an even harsher imitation of the AfD. Anyone who adopts the language and demands of a far-right party does not weaken it. They merely confirm to its supporters that it has already won the debate.
The remaining parties must make a functioning government possible without giving the AfD power over people, schools, police, culture, and democratic institutions. That requires old certainties to be reconsidered. If the CDU must choose between its incompatibility resolution toward the Left Party and the possibility of a far-right state government, those two issues can no longer be treated as equivalent problems.
They are not equivalent.
Nothing Has Been Decided Yet
The AfD has won the election. It has not yet taken control of the government. Between those two sentences lies the political room for maneuver that the other parties must now use responsibly.
Perhaps an uncomfortable minority government will emerge. Perhaps five very different parties will agree on a common candidate. Perhaps Saxony-Anhalt will be governed for years through changing parliamentary majorities. None of these solutions is attractive. But in a dangerous situation, politics does not have to be attractive. It has to protect democratic institutions and the people who would be targeted first by an AfD government.
What happened yesterday cannot be minimized. Almost 44 percent for a confirmed far-right extremist party marks a turning point. For Saxony-Anhalt and for Germany as a whole.
I hope the AfD does not enter government. I fear that this hope depends on a handful of votes in a secret ballot.
And I know that I will not forget this result.
Yours, Lizbeth
Stand: 7. September 2026. Alle Zahlen beruhen auf dem vorläufigen Wahlergebnis und können sich mit der amtlichen Feststellung noch geringfügig verschieben.
Quellen
Landeswahlleiterin Sachsen-Anhalt: Ergebnisse der Landtagswahl 2026
wahlrecht.de: Landtagswahl am 6. September 2026 in Sachsen-Anhalt, vorläufiges Ergebnis, Sitzverteilung und Wahlbeteiligung
ZDFheute: Sachsen-Anhalt, schwierige Regierungsbildung nach AfD-Erfolg
t-online: Drei Direktmandate für die Linke, der Rest geht an die AfD
Spiegel: Verfassungsschutz stuft AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt als gesichert rechtsextrem ein
Talzeit: Was die Einstufung als gesichert rechtsextrem bedeutet und wie der Rechtsstreit steht
AfD Sachsen-Anhalt: Regierungsprogramm "Das Land zuerst" zur Landtagswahl 2026 (PDF)
t-online: Wahlprogramm der AfD, was Siegmund schnell ändern will und was länger dauert
LTO, Dieter Dörr: Warum die AfD ihre Rundfunkversprechen rechtlich nicht halten kann
ZDFheute: Liveblog zur Wahl in Sachsen-Anhalt, Ergebnisse und Reaktionen
Handelsblatt: Newsblog zur Wahl in Sachsen-Anhalt, AfD will Gespräche über eine Regierung führen
euronews: Wie geht es in Sachsen-Anhalt weiter, Reaktionen der Spitzenpolitiker
Verfassungsblog: Ohne Frist, ohne Druck? Fristen der Ministerpräsidentenwahl
PolitPro: Wahltrend und Koalitionsrechner zur Landtagswahl in Sachsen-Anhalt
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